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Nesbitt: Representative Conyers Proposes National Health Insurance Act

NEWS

REPRESENTATIVE CONYERS PROPOSES

NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE ACT
By Amber Nesbitt

C

Conyers, Jr. of
ongressman John
Michiganintroduced
the United States National
Health Insurance Act (Act) to
the 1 0 8 th Congress on
February 4,2003. Ifpassed,
the Act would create a single
payer health care system that
is publicly financed, yet
privately delivered. The goal
of the Act is to ensure that all
Americans have access to
adequate health care in the
future and to correct the
"maldistribution of health
personnel and facilities by
establishing a system of
prepaid personal health
insurance." H.R. 15, 108th
Cong. § 2b (2003).
Currently, over 42
million Americans are
uninsured, and another 40
million are "under-insured."
Professor Karen Harris, a

visiting Professor of Health
Law at Loyola University's
Health Law Institute notes, "It

is undeniable that under the

current system millions of

Americans are lacking
adequate care. Moreover,
since these individuals have no
coverage they often delay
seeking care and then are
sicker when they finally do go

"Itis undeniable that under the currentsystem
millions of Americans are lacking adequate
care. Moreover, since these individuals have no
coverage they often delay seeking care and then
are sicker when they finally do go for services."
- Professor Karen Harris, Visiting
Professor of Health Law, Loyola
University Chicago School ofLaw, Health
Law Institute
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for services."
The many purposes
ofthe Act include recognizing
that national health is directly

linked to the prosperity of our
country, revamping the
outdated nature of the current
system that unfairly disadvantages the impoverished,
and establishing an entirely
new health care system.
Under the Act, all medically
necessary services would be
covered, including primary
care, inpatient and outpatient
care, emergency care,
durable medical equipment,
long term care, mental health
services, dentistry, eye care,
chiropractic, and substance
abuse treatment. The bill
would also allow patients to
Continued on Page 41.
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Special Registration,
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the implementation and maintenance of the
system. Adding to the confusion is the recent
elimination of the INS as of March 1, 2003 and
the transition of its functions from one agency
within the Department of Justice to three bureaus
within the Department of Homeland Security. 9
The new Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services (BCIS)* takes over the traditional visa
issuing and customer service functions that the
public typically associated with the day-to-day
duties of the INS. The Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (BICE)4 1 and the
Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol (BCBP)4 2
will oversee the enforcement of imigration and
customs law both in the interior and at points of
entry to the U.S., respectively. Thus, though
Special Registration may appear to fit into both
the BICE (call-in registration for those
nonimmigrant aliens already present in the U.S.)
and the BCBP (registration upon admission at a
point of entry), it is actually the BCIS that is
implementing and processing the call-in
registration program. This is just one more
example of the lack of clear direction of this
cumbersome system.
As for the outcome of Special
Registration, it remains to be seen. Whether the
nation will see any perceptible benefits generated
in return for the investment oftime and labor will
hopefully become apparent in the future. As the
Department of Homeland Security continues to
implement and expand the system, what it intends
to do with the information it is gathering and
whether Special Registration will ultimately prove
to be in the "national interest" will surely become
evident.
I See, Attorney General Prepared Remarks on the
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, June
6, 2002, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/
060502agpreparedremarks.htm.
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See, INA Sec. 263(a)(6).
See, 56 Fed. Reg. 1566.
4See, 58 Fed. Reg. 68024.
5
See, 58 Fed. Reg. 68157.
6See, 61 Fed. Reg. 46829.
1 See, 63 Fed. Reg. 39109.
1 See, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009, codified at 8 USC Sec. 1365a (IRAIRA).
9
See, Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
TerrorismAct of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(USA PATRIOT Act) and Enhanced Border Security
and Visa Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-73, 116 Stat.
543 (Border Security Act).
'oSee, 8 CFR Sec. 264.1(f)(3) and (4).
3

"See, 67 Fed. Reg. 52584.
See, note 11 supra.
See, Special Registration Proceduresfor Certain
Nonimmigrants (for all Call-In Groups), Questions
andAnswers, http://www.bcis.gov/graphics/lawenfor/
specialreg/CALLIN _ALL.pdf.
14 See, 63 Fed. Reg. 39109 (July 21, 1998).
5 See, 67 Fed. Reg. 57032 (September 6, 2002).
'6 See, Kris Kobach, Counsel to the AG, Foreign Press
Center Briefing, January 17, 2003, http://fpc.state.gov/
16739.htm.
1 See, 67 Fed. Reg. 67766 (November 6,2002).
' See, 67 Fed. Reg. 70526 (November 22,2002).
'9 See, 67 Fed. Reg. 77136 (December 16,2002).
20
See, 67 Fed. Reg. 77642 (December 18,2002).
21
See, 68 Fed. Reg. 2363 (January 16,2003).
22
See, 68 Fed. Reg. 2366 (January 16,2003).
23
See, 68 Fed. Reg. 8046 (February 19,2003).
24
See, 67 Fed. Reg. 67766 (November 6,2002).
2 Available on-line at http://www.bcis.gov/graphics/
formsfee/forms/ar- 11 sr.htm.
26
See, 8 C.F.R. § 217; 22 C.F.R. § 41.2 (many European
Union countries, Japan and others are exempt from
needing a visa to enter the U.S. as a visitor for business
or pleasure for a period not in excess of 90 days).
27
See, 8 C.F.R. § 217.4(b),(c).
28
See, 67 Fed. Reg. 40581-82 (June 13,2002).
29 See, Summaries of special registration procedures
and results reported by American Immigration
Lawyer's Association members, http://www.aila.org,
AILA InfoNet Doc. No. 02121642 (December 16,2002,
updated January 30, 2003).
30 The regulations do state, however, that the officers
may request any information they deem necessary in
the interest of national security.
31
See, INA § 245(i).
12
3
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32

See, Prosecutorial Discretion Guidelines (November
28,2000), http://www.bcis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/
factsheets/prosecut.htm.
33 See, Summaries of special registration procedures
and results, note 27 supra.
34

See, 8 C.F.R. §239.1.
See, 8 C.F.R. § 240.11(a), 240.20.
36
See, 8 C.F.R. 240.25,240.26.
3

Note: the respondent must follow procedures
established to ensure that he complies with the judge's
order granting voluntary departure, including reporting
to the U.S. consulate in his home country, or the
country designated for his return.
38
See, 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(a).
3
See, Press release regarding transition, February 28,
2003, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?
theme=43&content=489. Also, visit the new
Department of Homeland Security web site at
www.dhs.gov.
4 Visit the new BCIS web site at www.bcis.gov.
41 Visit the new BICE web site at www.bice.immigration.gov.
42
Visit the new BCBP web site at cbp.customs.gov.
1

Gender-Based Persecution,
Continued from Page 9.

protection, in part, due to the fact that she could
not show that her husband had abused other
women in her same position and that he beat her
indiscriminately, rather than for her resistance to
the abuse.
The anticipated erosion ofprotection for
women will result in the tacit support of such
practices. For A., the inability to be considered
for asylum would send her back into the arms of
her abuser and his faiily. The rewards for her
courage in finally seeking protection and a safe
future for her and her children should not be a
return to the past. At one point in our meeting,
A. raised her hands as if they were bound: "My
hands are still tied," she said. "I have struggled
to do the best for my children and yet he still has
control - he keeps me bound." If Attorney
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General Ashcroft has his way, the law will only
further secure the ties.
'For complete information on this program see http://
www.inimigration.gov/graphics/lawenfor/specialreg/
specialrtl.gif.
2
See, e.g. Silja J.A. Talvi, "INS Special Registration
Ends in Mass Arrests," In These Times *Feb. 7, 2003)
at 3.
3
"Pakistani families fleeing U.S. to Canada due to fear
of Homeland Security Department's registration
process," National Public Radio, Morning Edition (Mar.

28,2003).
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection:
Gender-Related Persecution within context of Article
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/
02/01 (May 7, 2002), available at,www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=MEDIA
&id=3d58ddef4&page=publ.
4

5

d.

6

Immigration

and Nationality

Act

(INA),

§101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(a).
7See supra footnote 4.

Impact of Klaeren v. Lisle,
Continued from Page 12.

observations are appropriate.
First, the right of cross-examination will
be available in at least some zoning hearings.24
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Appellate
Court offered any specific guidelines for
implementing these new rules. Thus,
municipalities will have the task of adopting
procedures "uniquely suited to local
conditions."2 5 The Appellate Court identified a
number ofthe procedural issues to be addressed,
including: (i) who are the beneficiaries of such
rights (i.e., who has standing to cross-examine);
(ii) what will be the allowable scope of crossexamination; (iii) which witnesses will have their
testimony subject to cross-examination; and (iv)
what factual issues are relevant for purposes of
cross-examination. 26 Although these issues may

Continued on Next Page.

PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REPORTER

SPRING 2003
3

Public Interest Law Reporter, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 13
FEATURES

Impact of Klaeren v. Lisle,
Continuedfrom Previous Page.
be customary for courts to decide, they are not
standard fare for local zoning officials, who in
the vast majority are not trained as attorneys.
Moreover, both the Appellate Court and Supreme
Court cautioned that reasonableness of such
procedures will be subject to judicial review
based on the particular circumstances.2 7
As a result, special use and other zoning
hearings will likely take on the character of"minitrials." This will necessarily increase the
complexity of the hearing process. Moreover,
because the Court has now recognized a
procedural due process claim where someone is
not extended adequate opportunities for crossexamination, municipalities will be faced with the
Hobson's Choice of allowing unrestrained crossexamination for every person who requests it, or
facing litigation every time someone believes his
or her cross-examination rights were improperly
curtailed. The former approach presents the risk
of interminable hearings (with associated
administrative and policy costs),28 while the latter
increases the need for (and cost of) legal services
for property owners, developers, and
municipalities alike.
Second, because more extensive hearing
preparation will be necessary to create an
effective hearing record, the valuable "give and
take" that has been characteristic ofIllinois zoning
may disappear. As hearing participants become
more heavily invested in promoting their positions
earlier in the process, the opportunity for
compromise will diminish and the likelihood of
litigation will increase.2 9 Moreover, courts can
expect more zoning litigation because Klaeren
has introduced a new form of zoning litigation
based solely on the procedures employed at a
public hearing, independent ofthe correctness
of the zoning decision.30
Third, the Klaerendecision may diminish
public participation. If certain zoning hearings
are now deemed quasi-judicial, a disappointed
PAGE 28
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applicant may be required to sue all residents
who asked questions at the hearing because they
are conceivably parties in interest.' Similarly,
any person who testifies may suddenly become
the subject of cross-examination by a petitioner
or another resident. Also, as the entire process
becomes increasingly legalistic, neighboring
property owners may feel that their rights cannot
be fully exercised without legal counsel. The cost
to the ordinary citizen of communicating to local
officials at public hearings may increase and
become prohibitive.
Finally, at least in the short-term,Klaeren
will cause much uncertainty as courts, property
owners, developers, neighbors, and municipalities
sort out numerous questions, such as: Who are
necessary parties? How do traditional LaSalle
factor cases and Klaeren-type reviews interrelate
(especially when both rezonings and special use
permits are often requested in order to advance
a development proposal)? What is the standard
of review in a Klaeren-based action? What
constitutes the record on review in such a case?
Whatever the ultimate outcome on these and
other questions, it is quite likely that zoning
decisions will take longer and cost more to be
finally resolved.
TAKING A STEP FORWARD By GOING

Before

BACK

going too far down the path paved
by Klaeren, it is worth asking an
important question: "Why?" The
changes wrought byKlaeren arise primarily from
the Supreme Court's decision to reverse more
than 40 years of precedent. In doing so, the
Court did not identify any existing problems with
the longstanding approach oftreating special use
permits as legislative acts. Rather, the Supreme
Court accepted on their face various
commentaries that most other States treat the
granting or denial of special use permits as

Continued on Next Page.
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adjudicative acts.3 2 Assuming that those
commentaries provide an accurate census of the
number of States following the adjudicative rather
than legislative approach, that still should not be
a sufficient justification for overturning 40-plus
years of precedent and ignoring the statutory
structure established by the General Assembly.
In many of the States where special use
permits are deemed an adjudicative process, the
statutory framework provides for the review of
special use permit decisions through an
established proceeding." In contrast, although
the General Assembly has enacted the
Administrative Review Law to provide judicial
oversight of administrative decisions in Illinois,
the Administrative Review Law does not apply
to zoning decisions made by municipal corporate
authorities.3 5
In addition, the Supreme Court's
decision was based in part on its conclusion that
the General Assembly intended to treat special
use permits as an adjudicative function when it
amended the law to require a separate hearing
body to develop findings offact for special use
permits.3 6 At the time of those amendments,
however, the prevailing judicial view of those
changes was that "the local legislature is
removed from the fact-finding process."7
More telling is that the Illinois Municipal Code
places no restrictions on the corporate authorities
of a municipality in approving a special use
permit, except that a super-majority vote may
be required ifthe hearing body does not make a
favorable recommendation. If the corporate
authorities were intended to function as an
adjudicative body, they would have been
constrained to make findings of fact based
exclusively on the hearing record. Instead, the
statute provides that the actions ofthe corporate
authorities are to be based on the ultimate
legislative measure - the sheer force of a vote.
Although the pre-Klaerenapproach of

,

PAGE'29

Published by LAW eCommons, 2003

having municipal councils legislatively decide on
special use permits (with property owners having
resort to the courts through aLaSalle factor case)
may not have been perfect, it was not broken.
So what was the Supreme Court trying to fix?
The Court gave no explanation. Because of the
additional expense and uncertainty that
municipalities, property owners, and members
ofthe public will experience from Klaeren, there
may be value in seeking a solution through the
General Assembly. A simple statement added
to Section 11-13-13 of the Municipal Code
could effectively reverse Klaeren, to-wit: "All
final decisions ofthe corporate authorities under
this Division shall be legislative actions."
In the months since Klaeren was
decided, problems that developers,
municipalities, and the general public will
encounter have become increasingly apparent.
As strange ofbedfellows as they may be, perhaps
the interests of all are served by returning special
use permits to the legislative arena. 9 As is often
the case, the evils we know are preferred to the
evils we don't.
People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 316 Ill.
App. 3d 770,737 N.E.2d 1099 (2d Dist. 2000).
2 People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village ofLisle, 202 Ill. 2d
164,781 N.E.2d 223(2002).
3781 N.E.2d at 225-29.
4Id. at 229.
1

5 Id.
6737

7

N.E.2d at 1107.

Id. at 1110.

at 233.
'Id. at 233-34.
'oId. at 234.
" The Supreme Court long ago recognized that
municipalities act legislatively when conducting zoning
hearings. LaSalle Nat '1 Bank v. County of Cook, 12
Ill. 2d 40 (1957). Moreover, the Supreme Court
confirmed the legislative nature of special use permits
in Kotrich v. County ofDuPage, 19 111. 2d 181 (1960),
and Illinois courts have consistently re-affirmed the
legislative character of special use permits.
8781N.E.2d

Continued on Next Page.
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N.E.2d at 234.
1 For example, an annexation agreement
under Division
11-15.1 of the Illinois Municipal Code, 65 ILCS 5/1115.1-1 et seq., must be presented at a public hearing
before it may be approved. By nature and statute,
such agreements are site specific and directly affect
property rights. Under the Court's decree in Klaeren,
a municipality's decision on whether and on what
terms to enter into an agreement (which is a voluntary
undertaking) would now be subject to judicial review.
Courts are singularly ill-equipped to review the wisdom
of such decisions, but the Klaeren formulation (a
public hearing where the property rights of interested
parties are at stake) would presumably bring such
matters before the courts.
" See River Park, Inc. v. City ofHighlandPark, 23 F.
3d 164, 166 (7" Cir. 1994), citing City ofEastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976)
(procedural due process can be satisfied for zoning
decisions through the political process without any
hearing); Hunter v. City ofPittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161
U.S. 178-79 (1907) (no process is constitutionally due
in annexation decisions).
"s Cf LaSalle Nat'lBank v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d
40,46-48 (1957). When planned developments or other
special use permits are involved, courts can evaluate
whether the LaSalle factors have been satisfied by
considering the standards for such relief as provided
in the local zoning ordinance. See LaSalle Nat'lBank
v. Village ofBloomingdale, 154 Ill. App. 3d 918 (2nd
Dist. 1987).
16 The statutory procedures of the Administrative
Review Law, 735 ILCS 5/3-101 etseq., apply only when
expressly authorized by statute. See also Wilkins v.
State ofIllinois, 51 Ill. 2d 88, 90 (1972) (administrative
review procedures are only available when expressly
authorized by statute). When the Administrative
Review Law does not apply, a common-law writ of
certiorariis available. See Alicea v. Snyder, 321 Ill.
12781

App. 3d 248,253, 748 N.E.2d 285, 290 (4h Dist. 2001)
("A common-law writ of certiorari is a general method
for obtaining circuit court review of administrative
actions when the act conferring power on an agency
does not expressly adopt the Administrative Review
Law."). The nature and extent of judicial review is
virtually the same under both the Administrative
Review Law and the common law writ. See Dubin v.
PersonnelBoard of City of Chicago, 128 Ill. 2d 490,
The primary difference is that the
498 (1989).
Administrative Review Law requires strict adherence

PAGE 30
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol8/iss2/13

to special statutory procedural requirements. See ESG
Watts, Inc. v. Pollution ControlBd., 191111. 2d 26, 30
(2000).
" See 65 ILCS 5/11-13-13. See also Wilkins, 51111. 2d at

90.
8 See Russell v. Dep 't ofNaturalResources, 183 Ill. 2d
434, 440-41 (1998) (certiorariis available when there
is no other available form of review).
' See Zenith Vending Corp. v. Village ofSchaumburg,

180 Ill. App. 3d 354,361-62 (1" Dist. 1989).
20781 N.E.2d at 233.
21

See Bieretz v. Village ofMontgomery, 67 Ill. App.

2d 403 (2d Dist. 1966).
22

See 65 ILCS 5/11-13-14.
2 See 65 LLCS 5/11-13-13 (administrative review applies
when the zoning board makes a final administrative
decision).
24 Although final variation hearings before zoning
boards of appeals have long been recognized as quasijudicial hearings, the right of interested parties to crossexamine witnesses has not been apparent in
municipalities outside Chicago. The Illinois Municipal
Code provisions extending rights of cross-examination
apply expressly only to municipalities over 500,000.
65 ILCS 5/11-13-7a.
21737 N.E.2d at 1111.
26
Id. at 1110-12.
27781 N.E.2d at 235-36; 737 N.E.2d at 1111.
28 The administrative costs will be further increased
because full transcripts may become necessary to
preserve the record for future review of the newly
ordained quasi-judicial hearings. Municipal officials
have expressed concern that interminable hearings will
negatively affect public policy decisions by making it
difficult to recruit qualified citizens to serve on zoning
boards of appeals and plan commissions. Such bodies
typically consist only of volunteers.
9 The likelihood of litigation will be further increased
because municipal zoning staffs will be required to
take an adversarial position with every zoning petition
since (i) they will not have received any direction from
the corporate authorities on the acceptability of any
particular petition (and, in fact, such pre-hearing
direction may be inappropriate because of the need to
preserve the objectivity of a quasi-judicial body), and
(ii) if they do not, the municipalities will be hampered
in defending denials of zoning requests.
30 Such litigation is not fanciful, as astute neighbors
will realize that the delay of litigation can, in many
instances, effectively kill a development proposal.

Continued on Next Page.
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Continued from Page 14.

Under the Administrative Review Law, the appellant
has to name as a defendant every party of record to
the Administrative Review proceeding. See 735 ILCS
5/3-107. Although no Illinois appellate court has
extended this rule to apply to common law certiorari
proceedings, no Illinois appellate court has held
specifically that it does not apply. But see Bill v.
Education Officers Electoral Bd. of Comm. Consol.
Sch. Dist. No. 181,299 Ill. App. 3d 548,554,701 N.E.2d
262,266 (1" Dist. 1998) ("[I]t is critical to recognize that
the Administrative Review Law only applies where it
is adopted by express reference in the act creating or
conferring power upon the administrative agency
involved.").
32 City of Chicago Hts. v. Living Word OutreachFull
Gospel Church of Ministries, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 1, 14
(2001).
3 See, e.g., Jennings v. Dade County, 589 So. 2d 1337
(Fla. 3dDCA 1991).
34 735 ILCS 5/3-101 etseq.
3 The Illinois Municipal Code expressly applies the
Administrative Review Law only to the final decisions
of municipal boards of appeals. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-14.
Interestingly, while the Circuit, Appellate, and Supreme
Courts in Klaeren all relied on E&E HaulingInc. v.
County ofDuPage, 77 111. App. 3d 1017 (2d Dist. 1979),
in suggesting that adjudicative procedures are required
in connection with a municipal special use permit, not
one of them considered that the General Assembly
has made decisions of county boards (unlike municipal
boards) expressly subject to review under the
Administrative Review Law. 55 ILCS 5/1-6007.
3
6 Living Word, 196 111. 2d at 15-16, relying on Geneva
ResidentialAss'nv. City ofGeneva, 77 111. App. 3d 744
(2d Dist. 1979).
3
Geneva ResidentialAss'n, 77 111. App. 3d at 754-755
(emphasis added).
38 65 ILCS 5/11-13-1.1. In fact, unless the corporate
authorities of the municipality expressly adopt an
ordinance calling for a two-thirds vote, the vote
required to overturn the recommendation ofthe hearing
body is a simple majority.
19 This proposal to return to treating the zoning
decisions of municipal corporate authorities as
legislative should not be interpreted as opposition by
the authors to fair opportunity for the public to
comment on, and object to, various zoning proposals.

Secretary of State, the U.S. Department of State,
and the U.S. Department ofTreasury.
RESULTS

& RECOMMENDATIONS

CusToMER SERVICE:

Parents

A FAILING OF THE

ILLINOIS SYSTEM

who try to use the services of

Illinois' IV-D program find that child

support workers are unhelpful,
uninformed, and rude. They have a difficult time
locating anyone at IDPA who can give them
information about their case or answer their
questions. Some reasons for the poor customer
service in Illinois are a high caseload per child
support worker, a lack of technology such as an
automated customer service phone system,
insufficient training, and inconvenient operating
hours.
Chicago Appleseed recommends that
the IV-D agency adopt the following in order to
improve its service to its customers:
1. Open local offices at convenient locations
and hours;
2. Reduce caseload per worker;
3. Respond to customer grievances;
4. Evaluate employees and hold them
accountable;
5. Improve technology by installing a voice
mail and automated phone system; and
6. Implement a child support worker
certification program.
STRUCTURE OF THE CHILD SUPPoRT,

IV-D

AGENCY

he heavily bureaucratic and disjointed
structure ofIllinois' IV-D program has
resulted in a system where effective
communication is non-existent. Because ofthis,
child support workers do not have a broad picture
of how all the components of the system fit
together. Instead, they are only able to focus on
Continued on Next Page.
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Child Support,
Continued from Previous Page.
the performance of their narrowjob functions.
Therefore, when a parent asks a question about
a part ofthe process beyond the worker's narrow
job function, the worker is unable to answer the
question but instead refers the parent to someone
else. Or even worse, the child support worker
gives out inaccurate information that can lead to
real problems down the road for the parent.
The structure of Illinois' IV-D program
has resulted in a variety ofproblems including
inordinate delays, unreliable and hard-to-get
information, and uninformed workers. Some
policies and practices that contribute to the
problems are that each child support case does
not have a "go to" person assigned to the case,
workers do not understand and cannot explain
the child support process to parents, child support
workers are overloaded, intake is conducted by
non-legally trained personnel, and the IV-D
agency does not provide enough services to noncustodial parents.
Recommendations for Illinois from
national child support experts include creating an
independent state agency to handle child support,
converting the funding source to general
appropriations, increasing funding for the IV-D
program, reducing the number of agencies
involved, and distributing all child support to
families.
To improve the structure of the IV-D
agency, Chicago Appleseed recommends that
Ilinois:
1. Create a single agency with the sole
responsibility of child support in Cook
County;
2. Develop client service teams;
3. Have IV-D agency staff perform
functions that are not outsourced;
4. Implement intake procedures that assign
cases to the appropriate unit based on
its needs;
5. Train staff well in legal skills, domestic
violence issues, and ancillary services so
PAGE 32
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they can make effective referrals;
6. Assure that staffing level is appropriate;
and
7. Evaluate employees on performance and
customer service.
THE EXPEDITED DIVISION

he Expedited Child Support Division
ofthe Domestic Relations Division of the
Circuit Court utilizes hearing officers to
reduce the number of cases heard by judges.
Only where one of the parties contests the
recommended order ofa hearing officer will the
case be sent to a courtroom. Advantages ofthis
structure are that it reduces the caseload ofthe
judges and increases the speed with which cases
are processed.
Problems have arisen, however, with the
Expedited Division. Attorneys in particular feel
that going through hearing officers causes more
delay, not less. This is because an attorney will
almost always disagree with the hearing officer's
recommendation, so the case will have to be
argued and heard twice, once in front of the
hearing officer and once in front of the judge.
Another concern is that never-married parents
are relegated to the Expedited Division, while
cases involving divorce are heard in the Circuit
Court. Individuals familiar with the facilities at
both locations complain that the condition ofthe
Expedited Division is much poorer thanthe Circuit
Court, and that the Expedited Division is much
more crowded than the Circuit Court.

Attorneys
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do not represent a large
majority of non-custodial parents with
child support cases in the Expedited
Division. This is particularly problematic because
almost all custodial parents are assisted by
attorneys provided by the State's Attorney's
Office. As a result, non-custodial parents many
times leave hearings confused and with a feeling
that the system is unfairly biased in favor of the
custodial parent. It is important that someone be
Continued on Next Page.
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